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Oil and the U.S. Macroeconomy:
An Update and a Simple Forecasting Exercise
Kevin L. Kliesen
Some analysts and economists recently warned that the U.S. economy faces a much higher risk
of recession should the price of oil rise to $100 per barrel or more. In February 2008, spot crude
oil prices closed above $100 per barrel for the first time ever, and since then they have climbed
even higher. Meanwhile, according to some surveys of economists, it is highly probable that a
recession began in the United States in late 2007 or early 2008. Although the findings in this paper
are consistent with the view that the U.S. economy has become much less sensitive to large changes
in oil prices, a simple forecasting exercise using Hamilton’s model augmented with the first princi-
pal component of 85 macroeconomic variables reveals that a permanent increase in the price of
crude oil to $150 per barrel by the end of 2008 could have a significant negative effect on the growth
rate of real gross domestic product in the short run. Moreover, the model also predicts that such
an increase in oil prices would produce much higher overall and core inflation rates in 2009 than
most policymakers expect. (JEL E37, E66, Q43)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, September/October 2008, 90(5), pp. 505-16.
U.S. economy to fall into a recession. Since then,
spot WTI prices have risen to more than $130
per barrel, and officials from the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and some
financial market participants have recently pre-
dicted that oil prices could eventually reach $200
per barrel.2
Some recent research suggests that the econ-
omy responds differently to an oil price shock,
depending on the initial prevailing macroeco-
nomic conditions and, moreover, whether the
oil price increase is (i) moderate and steady, as
occurred from 2003 to 2006, or (ii) rapid and large,
as occurred since 2007. Moreover, small time-
series models may capture the aggregate economic
effects of large oil price increases over relatively
I
n December 2001, the spot price of West
Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil aver-
aged $19.33 per barrel. Shortly thereafter,
oil prices started to trend higher. After a
brief decline from $74 per barrel in July 2006 to
about $55 per barrel in January 2007, oil prices
then resumed their upward trajectory. They sur-
passed $90 per barrel in October 2007. Mean-
while, participants and traders in the crude oil
futures market did not foresee the sharp rise in
prices. However, some economists and energy
analysts correctly expected the price of crude
oil to eventually rise to $100 per barrel or more,
and crude oil prices eventually closed above $100
per barrel on February 19 this year for the first
time ever.1 Some of these analysts also predicted
that $100-per-barrel crude oil would cause the
1 See Greenspan (2007), King and Chazan (2007), and Verleger (2007).
2 See Hoyos (2008). Alternatively, Brown, Virmani, and Alm (2008)
contend that oil prices are not likely to remain above $100 per
barrel (in 2008 dollars) unless there is a significant supply shock.
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(Huntington, 2005). Using an augmented model
proposed by Hamilton (2003), this article will
show that a permanent increase in the spot price
of crude oil to either $100 or $150 per barrel would
cause a modest slowing in real GDP growth and
its major components relative to a baseline forecast
without oil prices. This result could be important
given the relatively weak growth over the first
half of 2008. Moreover, this model also predicts
that an increase in the spot price of crude oil to
$150 per barrel will cause both overall and core
inflation rates to rise to 4 percent in 2009. This
inflation forecast is well above the expectations
of Federal Reserve policymakers in early 2008.
OIL AND MACROECONOMIC
ACTIVITY: A SHORT REVIEW
Figure 1 shows that nearly all post-World
War II recessions in the United States were pre-
ceded by, or accompanied by, an increase in oil
prices.3 Accordingly, oil price shocks tend to be
viewed with alarm by forecasters, macroecono-
mists, financial market participants, and public
policymakers.4 An oil price shock is typically a
large, unexpected increase in the relative price
of energy that affects the economic decisions of
firms and households.5 Moreover, higher oil prices
engender direct and indirect (second-order) effects
that vary in magnitude across time. In the short
run, the price elasticities of the supply and
demand for oil are likely very low because firms
and consumers find it difficult to change their
energy consumption habits immediately and new
sources of oil or alternative sources of energy are
Kliesen
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3 The behavior of oil prices was decidedly different before the 1970s.
According to Hamilton (1985), changes in U.S. crude oil prices
prior to the 1970s were influenced importantly by decisions of the
Texas Railroad Commission, a state regulatory agency that actively
sought to control the production of Texas crude oil. As a result,
domestic oil prices were remarkably stable during this period.
4 See Bernanke (2004).
5 See Jones, Leiby, and Paik (2004) and Hamilton (2005) for a survey
of the oil-macroeconomy literature.
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Figure 1
Real and Nominal Changes in Spot Oil Prices
NOTE: NBER, National Bureau of Economic Research.not immediately available. Over the longer term,
these price elasticities increase. Higher prices
not only spur producers to seek new sources of
crude oil, but also provide important incentives
to conserve energy and increase the production of
alternative energy sources.
An oil price increase may lower real gross
domestic product (GDP) growth through other
channels. First, higher prices raise uncertainty
about future oil prices and thus cause delays in
business investment (e.g., Bernanke, 1983, and
Pindyck, 1991). Guo and Kliesen (2005), for exam-
ple, find that increased oil price volatility from
1984 to 2004 had a significant effect on key meas-
ures of U.S. macroeconomic activity, such as busi-
ness capital spending. Second, oil price changes
induce resource reallocation, and such realloca-
tion is costly (e.g., Lilien, 1982, Davis and
Haltiwanger, 2001, and Lee and Ni, 2002). Not
surprisingly, the large, sustained increase in oil
prices since 2007 that has pushed the national
average price of gasoline past $4 per gallon has
precipitated some potentially long-term resource
reallocation in the automotive industry. Currently,
automotive manufacturers are actively engaged
in the design and production of hybrid vehicles
or vehicles that run on biofuels or alternative fuels,
such as hydrogen. This entails various changes:
for example, the design of new components,
including lithium batteries and drive trains, and
the training of automotive technicians accustomed
to working solely on internal combustion engines.
The link between oil price changes and eco-
nomic activity is complicated by other factors,
such as economic growth and the influence of
domestic monetary policymakers.6 For example,
Huntington (2005) argues that oil price shocks
that occur after a period of low inflation and low
interest rates are less likely to cause a recession
or a significant slowing of real GDP than if the
prior economic conditions were high inflation
and high interest rates. According to Barsky and
Kilian (2004), the link between higher oil prices
and weaker economic growth is complicated by
the endogeneity of oil prices. This view holds
that demand shocks, rather than supply shocks,
have been the dominant factors explaining higher
oil prices. In a similar vein, Aguiar-Conraria and
Wen (2007) study the demand channel of oil
shocks during the 1970s.
Estimates of the short-run macroeconomic
effects of higher oil prices on real GDP growth
vary. According to a 2005 survey of several macro-
economic models reported by Huntington, a $10-
per-barrel increase in the price of oil is expected
to reduce output in the United States by about
0.25 percentage points in the first year and about
0.5 percentage points in the second year (relative
to a baseline forecast).7 A study published by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in December
2000 (Robinson et al.) showed that a permanent
$5-per-barrel increase in the price of oil would
reduce world real GDP growth by about 0.25 per-
centage points per year over the first four years;
the effect on U.S. real GDP growth over the same
period was slightly larger than 0.3 percentage
points per year.8 Similar results were found for
models used by the Federal Reserve (MULTIMOD),
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (INTERLINK), and the Brookings
Institution (McKibbin-Sachs Global model).
The Effects of Oil Price Changes on
Output and Inflation Since 1970
A rough approximation of the potential
effects of higher oil prices on real GDP growth
and inflation can be derived with the simple
model used by Hamilton (2003):
(1)
In this analysis, yt is a measure of the log
change in real GDP at an annual rate.9 The oil
∆∆ ∆ ln ln ln yy x t it i it i
i
() =+ () + ()    + −−
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6 Regarding the latter, see, among others, Bernanke et al. (1997),
Leduc and Sill (2004), and Hamilton and Herrera (2004).
7 These models assume a constant price elasticity in the short term
because of the limited ability to substitute away from oil as an
energy source.
8 The IMF used the average price of Brent (United Kingdom), Dubai,
and WTI grades. In November 2000, this reference price averaged
about $32 per barrel according to the IMF.
9 Hamilton originally used the log change in real GDP at a quarterly
rate.price change, xt, is the price of crude oil trans-
formed according to Hamilton (2003).10 Hamilton
showed that an asymmetric measure of oil prices
helps explain real GDP growth. He also showed
that the sum of the coefficients on the lagged
values of the net oil price (NOP) measure was
highly significant, even though some of the indi-
vidual coefficients were not. Hamilton’s measure
of the NOP is constructed as follows: The current-
quarter price of oil is compared with the maximum
price over the previous 12 quarters. If the percent-
age difference is positive, that observation is used;
but if the percentage difference is negative, that
month’s observation is set to zero. For example,
in the fourth quarter of 2007 (December 2007), the
spot price of WTI crude oil was $91.73 per barrel.
Over the previous 12 quarters (2004:Q4–2007:Q3),
the maximum crude oil price was $79.93 per
barrel, a difference of 14.8 percent. If the price
of WTI was $79.93 per barrel or less in 2007:Q4
(producing a zero or negative percentage change),
the observation for that quarter would have been
set to equal zero. Thus, in the Hamilton frame-
work, only energy price increases matter; energy
price decreases do not matter.
Table 1 shows regression results of the above
equation and three alternative specifications.
The sample period is 1970:Q1–2007:Q4. The
analysis begins in 1970:Q1 because, as is evident
from the discussion of Figure 1, oil prices were
relatively stable before 1970. Accordingly, a large
percentage of observations for the Hamilton NOP
variable are zeroes before 1970. Second, all of the
major oil price shocks have occurred since 1973.
Regression (1) in Table 1 reports results from
a model that predicts future real GDP growth
using lagged growth rates. Although this simple
AR(4) model is commonly used to predict future
GDP growth, the adjusted R
2 is quite low, 0.06.
Regression (2) is equivalent to equation (1) at the
beginning of this section. Adding the NOP variable
doubles the explanatory power of the model, as
the adjusted R
2 rises to 0.12. Interestingly, adding
the NOP variable renders insignificant the first
and second lags of real GDP growth, which were
significant in regression (1).
In Table 1, regressions (3) and (4) extend
Hamilton’s model by adding the Chicago Fed
National Activity Index (CFNAI), zt:
(2)
The CFNAI is the first principal component,
or common factor, of 85 monthly indicators of
real economic activity.11 Much empirical research
has shown that principal components can signifi-
cantly improve the forecasting performance of
major macroeconomic variables such as real GDP
growth and inflation.12 This result is reinforced
in regressions (3) and (4) in Table 1. Adding the
contemporaneous and lagged value of the CFNAI
(zt and zt–1) to both the AR(4) model and
Hamilton’s equation (equation (2)) shows that
the CFNAI is highly significant.13 In addition,
the first and second lags of NOP are now also
highly significant. As a result, the explanatory
power of regressions (3) and (4) is significantly
larger than for regressions (1) and (2). Adding
the CFNAI reduces the sum of the NOP coeffi-
cients from –0.19 in regression (2) to –0.09 in
regression (4).
A further extension of Hamilton’s analysis
can be seen in Table 2. In this case, the analysis
examines whether the NOP variable helps to
predict the growth of real GDP—and, separately,
its major components—and inflation (log change)
using four separate price measures. The inflation
series are based on the overall price indices meas-
ured by the consumer price index (CPI) and the
∆ln ln ln yy x t i ti i ti
i
() =+ () + ()    
+
−−











11 See the “CFNAI Background Release” (www.chicagofed.org/
economic_research_and_data/files/cfnai_background.pdf) and
“CFNAI Technical Report” (www.chicagofed.org/economic_
research_and_data/files/cfnai_technical_report.pdf) on the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago web site.
12 See Gavin and Kliesen (2008) and references cited therein.
13 The second, third, and fourth lags of CFNAI were dropped
because they were not significant.
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10 This analysis uses the spot price of WTI crude oil. Hamilton (2003)
used the producer price index for crude petroleum. The quarterly
value is not the average of the monthly observations (e.g., January,
February, and March), but instead it is the last month of the quarter
(March, June, September, December).personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price
index (PCEPI), as well as their respective “core”
measures that exclude food and energy prices.
The empirical results reported in Table 2 are
based on equation (2) above. However, instead
of reporting each of the coefficients (and their
statistical significance) of the independent vari-
ables (including the CFNAI terms), Table 2 reports
only the sum of the coefficients on the lagged
NOP terms for each expenditure category. The
GDP expenditure categories and price variables
thus become, separately, the yt terms. Each row
in Table 2 also shows an F-statistic to determine
the significance of the sum of the coefficients on
NOP variables. In addition to the entire sample
period(from1970:Q1–2007:Q4),Table2alsoshows
results for three subperiods: 1970:Q1–1982:Q4,
1983:Q1–1994:Q4, and 1995:Q1–2007:Q4. The
partition of the second and third periods reflects,
respectively, the onset of the Great Moderation
and the acceleration in trend productivity
growth.14
Effects on Output. Table 2 shows that ener-
gy price increases significantly help to predict
real GDP growth and most of its components.
However, the size of this effect varies across
Kliesen
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14 See Anderson and Kliesen (2006).
Table 1
Predicting Real GDP Growth (yt) Using Lagged Real GDP Growth, Oil Prices (xt), and the
Chicago Fed National Activity Index, zt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.90*** 2.91*** 4.84*** 5.33***
(0.45) (0.52) (0.45) (0.48)
yt–1 0.22*** 0.14 –0.26*** –0.31***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
yt–2 0.14* 0.08 –0.13** –0.15**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
yt–3 0.00 –0.01 –0.17*** –0.16***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
yt–4 0.01 0.00 –0.06 –0.06














2 0.06 0.12 0.55 0.58
DW 2.00 2.00 1.99 2.03
NOTE: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. DW, Durbin-Watson. The sample period is
1970:Q1–2007:Q4. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.Kliesen











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1indicators and across time. Over the entire sam-
ple period the sum of the energy coefficients on
real GDP growth was highly significant, though
modest (–0.09). The first row of Table 2 indicates
that the oil price increases had their largest effect
on real GDP growth (–0.13) over the final period.
This is perhaps surprising, given the acceleration
in productivity growth and the continued drop
in energy usage per unit of GDP. This result may
reflect the relatively sharp, unexpected increase
in energy prices that have occurred since then.
The effects of energy price increases on real GDP
growth were much smaller during the Great
Inflation period (–0.06). The effects of higher
energy prices on real GDP growth were even
smaller in the subsequent period (–0.005).
Table 2 reveals other interesting findings.
First, during the Great Inflation, the largest (neg-
ative) effects of oil price increases were on real
residential fixed investment and imports; how-
ever, the effect on real consumer spending (PCE)
was relatively small during this period. Second,
the smallest effect of oil price increases on the
components of real GDP occurred from 1983 to
1994. The notable exception was real consumer
spending. During this period (1983-94), the sum
of the NOP coefficients was –0.19, substantially
larger than both the previous and following
periods. Moreover, in the cases of real fixed
investment in business equipment and software
and real imports, the sign not only became posi-
tive during the 1983-94 period, but the significance
of oil price increases disappeared altogether.
Third, since 1995, the sensitivity of real equip-
ment and software investment has increased sig-
nificantly. This is consistent with the literature
reports cited earlier, in which increasing oil prices
had a sizable influence on business capital spend-
ing. In fact, the coefficient is about equal in mag-
nitude to that of the second period, but the sign
is changed. In addition, higher oil prices now
help to predict business investment in structures.
However, this change could reflect the fact that
the share of nominal fixed investment in drilling
and mining activity as a percent of nominal non-
residential fixed investment increased from about
1.75 percent in 1995 to 8 percent in 2007. Finally,
although the effect of oil price increases on real
PCE since 1995 has diminished somewhat com-
pared with the 1983-94 period (from –0.19 to
–0.11), the sum of the coefficients is more signif-
icant compared with the 1970-82 period.
Effects on Consumer Price Inflation. The
last four rows of Table 2 show the results of
equation (2) as applied to the four price series
previously mentioned.15 Since 1970, the sum of
the coefficients on oil price increases, which
have the expected positive sign and are highly
significant, are essentially the same for both the
total CPI and the total PCEPI (0.04). The sums of
the coefficients on the core price indices are also
roughly equal to each other, but the sums of the
coefficients are larger, and even more significant,
than for the total price measures. It appears that
the latter effect stems from the Great Inflation
period. Since 1983, the effects of higher oil
prices on core inflation have been much more
modest and considerably smaller than those on
the total price measures. The results in Table 2
provide some evidence for the decision by the
Federal Open Market Committee to place some-
what more emphasis on core PCEPI inflation
during the run-up in oil prices over the past
several years.
A Simple Forecasting Exercise
Results from Tables 1 and 2 suggest that past
oil price increases are statistically significant
predictors of economic activity and inflation in
the current quarter. This section provides some
evidence that Hamilton’s NOP variable helps to
forecast the growth of economic activity and
inflation one quarter ahead. In this experiment,
the baseline forecast uses an AR(4) model aug-
mented with the CFNAI; this is a one-period-
ahead version of regression (3) in Table 1—that
is, excluding oil prices. The unrestricted model
adds Hamilton’s NOP series as an explanatory
Kliesen
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15 A version of Table 1 was estimated for the PCEPI and core PCEPI
series. That is, inflation was regressed on (i) four lags of inflation,
(ii) four lags of Hamilton’s NOP measure, and (iii) the contempo-
raneous and lagged value of the CFNAI. In results not published
here, the adjusted R2 for PCEPI inflation in (i) is 0.76. Adding the
CFNAI increased the adjusted R2 to 0.78; the adjusted R2 for the
AR(4) for core PCEPI is 0.82; and adding the CFNAI boosted the
adjusted R2 to 0.83. Adding Hamilton’s NOP to the latter model
raised adjusted R2 to 0.86. These results are available on request.variable (regression (4) in Table 1). The analysis
continues to use the spot price of WTI as before,
but now includes the producer price index (PPI)
for domestic crude petroleum as an alternative
measure of oil prices.16 Again, each of these oil
price series is modified according to the Hamilton
specification. First, the restricted model (without
energy) is estimated from 1970:Q1 to 2001:Q4.
The model is estimated for each of the output
and price series listed in Table 2. Next, one-step-
ahead pseudo–out-of-sample forecasts (with and
without energy) are computed from 2002:Q1 to
2007:Q4. Table 3 presents the root mean square
errors (RMSEs) from this forecasting exercise.
The value of any forecast to the practitioner
or the policymaker is its accuracy. A standard
test of forecast accuracy is the one proposed by
Diebold and Mariano (1995; DM). However, as
Clark and McCracken (2001; CM) point out, the
DM test is not appropriate for nested models such
as those used here. In Table 3, the null hypothesis
is that the baseline forecasts (without NOP) and
the augmented forecast (with NOP) have the same
predictive power. Based on the CM test statistic,
Table 3 shows that spot oil price increases can
help improve the baseline, one-quarter-ahead
forecast for the growth of real GDP, real PCE, and
real imports. However, this is not the case for the
PPI measure of oil prices. In all other series listed
in Table 3, the PPI measure of oil prices—which
is the series Hamilton used—does not improve
the baseline forecast. However, Table 3 shows
that adding the WTI spot oil price increase to the
price equations marginally improves the RMSEs
of the forecasts for overall CPI and PCE inflation.
For example, adding the spot WTI to the CPI
16 The PPI series is the oil price series used in Hamilton’s analysis.
Kliesen
512 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2008 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
Table 3
Evaluating Forecasts With and Without Oil Price Increases
Variable Base +WTI +PPI
Expenditures
Real GDP 1.60 1.56 1.57
PCE 1.55 1.41 1.47
Fixed investment 5.21 5.28 5.38
Business investment 5.60 5.69 5.94
Structures 8.83 8.86 9.45
Equipment and software 5.98 6.00 6.05
Residential 9.27 9.48 10.03
Exports 7.13 7.35 7.30
Imports 5.31 4.69 4.96
Prices
CPI 2.03 2.01 2.03
Core CPI 0.63 0.81 0.91
PCEPI 1.47 1.46 1.48
Core PCEPI 0.51 0.61 0.59
NOTE: Data are presented as root mean square forecast errors in percent. The base forecast is an AR(4) model augmented with the
contemporaneous and first lag of the CFNAI. The alternative models are augmented with either the spot price of West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) or the PPI for domestic crude petroleum production. Both oil prices are transformed according to Hamilton (2003). The augmented
model is regression (4) from Table 1. The base and alternative models are estimated for the period 1970:Q1–2001:Q4. Then, one-step-
ahead pseudo-forecasts are estimated for 2002:Q1–2007:Q4. Forecast errors in bold indicate that the forecast errors from the augmented
model are significantly different from the base model according to the Clark-McCracken test.inflation forecasting equation reduces the RMSE
from 2.03 (baseline) to 2.01. Notably, the RMSE
for the PCEPI inflation forecasts are much smaller
than those for the CPI series.
Alternative scenarios of economic growth and
inflation over the near term matter most for con-
ducting monetary policy. Accordingly, the analy-
sis is now extended to gauge the potential effects
of higher oil prices on economic growth and infla-
tion in 2008 and 2009. First, the model for each
variable is estimated for the 1970:Q1–2007:Q4
period. Next, the model is used to forecast out-of-
sample growth rates for the 2008:Q1–2009:Q4
period. The baseline forecast is the same AR(4)
model augmented with the CFNAI.17 The baseline
forecast is augmented with two separate scenar-
ios for the spot price of WTI to gauge the effects
of higher oil prices through 2009. In the first sce-
nario, the spot price of WTI averages $100 per
barrel for the four quarters of 2008 and remains
at that level through 2009:Q4. In the second sce-
nario, the spot price of WTI increases from $100
per barrel in 2008:Q1 to $150 per barrel in 2009:Q1
and then remains at that level until 2009:Q4.18
Finally, these forecasts are compared with the
forecasts released by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF) on February 12, 2008. One drawback to the
SPF is that the quarterly forecast horizon extends
only to 2009:Q1.
Huntington (2005), in a study that compares
different types of macroeconomic models, argues
that small time-series models may capture the
aggregate economic effects of large oil price
increases that occur over relatively short periods—
like those that have occurred since 2007. He argues
that structural models are better able to capture
the economic impacts of a gradual increase in oil
prices. Table 4 shows out-of-sample forecasts
using Hamilton’s augmented model. Forecasted
annual average growth rates for 2008 and 2009
are shown for real GDP, real PCE, real business
fixed investment, and PCEPI and core PCEPI
inflation.19 As shown, the baseline forecast for
real GDP growth in 2008 (2.4 percent) is mod-
estly more optimistic than the SPF forecast (1.9
percent). The baseline forecast incorporating the
assumption of $100 per barrel oil in 2008—a
modest step up from its average of $91.73 per
barrel in the fourth quarter of 2007—lowers the
forecast for real GDP growth in 2008 by slightly
less than 0.25 percentage points to about 2.25
percent.20
Table 4 suggests that an additional $50-per-
barrel increase in oil prices reduces the forecast
for real GDP growth in 2008 by about another 0.25
percentage points, so that $150-per-barrel oil cuts
the forecast for real GDP growth in 2008 by 0.5
percentage points from its baseline forecast (2.4
percent). The model thus predicts that each $10-
per-barrel permanent increase in spot oil prices
reduces real GDP growth by 0.1 percentage points
within one year, and even less after two years.
Recall that Huntington (2005) found that each
$10-per-barrel increase in crude oil reduced real
GDP growth by about 0.25 percentage points.
For 2009, the baseline model predicts that
real GDP will increase 3.1 percent.21 The predicted
growth for real GDP in 2009 with either of the
two oil price scenarios differs little from the
baseline forecast. In either case, the unrestricted
Hamilton model does not predict long-lasting
effects on real GDP growth from an increase in
oil prices. Hence, once oil prices stabilize, and
the drag from higher oil prices ends, the model
predicts that real GDP will converge to trend-like
growth relatively quickly. This is a common
characteristic of most forecasting models.
Forecasts for the remaining variables in
Table 4 are generally consistent with the findings
from Tables 2 and 3: Higher oil prices have their
largest effects on real consumer expenditures. In
Kliesen
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19 The data series were last updated on February 28, 2008.
20 Growth rates for the year are forecast averages for the four quarters
of each year.
21 The February 10, 2008, Blue Chip Economic Indicators reported
that the Blue Chip Consensus predicts that real GDP would
increase by 2.6 percent in 2009. A consensus forecast published
by the National Association for Business Economics on February
25, 2008, predicted that real GDP would increase by 2.9 percent
in 2009.
17 An AR(4) model is used to estimate the out-of-sample values for
the CFNAI.
18 Spot WTI is assumed to rise 10.75 percent per quarter from
2008:Q1 to 2009:Q1, reaching a level of $150.44 per barrel.2008, $100-per-barrel oil is predicted to reduce
the growth of real PCE by 0.3 percentage points,
while an increase to $150 per barrel produces an
additional decline of about 0.25 percentage points
relative to the baseline forecast. Comparing the
baseline forecast for real PCE growth in 2009
with the forecast that assumes $150-per-barrel
oil suggests that higher oil prices will have mod-
estly more persistent negative effects on real con-
sumption spending: 3.4 percent (baseline) versus
3.0 percent ($150 per barrel) than on real GDP
growth. Table 4 also suggests that higher oil prices
will have considerably more modest short-run
effects on business capital spending (business
fixed investment), but the effects will not be as
persistent as predicted for real consumer spend-
ing. Nevertheless, these results are generally, but
perhaps weakly, consistent with the literature that
finds significant negative effects on business
capital spending from higher oil prices.
Perhaps the most interesting findings are
those associated with the inflation forecasts. First,
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Table 4
Forecasts of Real Output and Expenditure Growth and Price Inflation
Averages of Quarterly Data at Annual Rates
Indicator 2007 2008 2009
Real GDP (Actual)
SPF 2.5 1.9 NA
Baseline 2.4 3.1
Baseline + $100 oil 2.2 3.2
Baseline + $150 oil 1.9 3.0
Real PCE
SPF 2.5 1.9 NA
Baseline 3.1 3.4
Baseline + $100 oil 2.8 3.6
Baseline + $150 oil 2.6 3.0
Business fixed investment
SPF 7.3 2.1 NA
Baseline 2.7 4.4
Baseline + $100 oil 2.7 4.5
Baseline + $150 oil 2.5 4.4
PCEPI
SPF 3.4 2.5 NA
Baseline 3.2 3.2
Baseline + $100 oil 3.6 3.3
Baseline + $150 oil 3.7 4.0
Core PCEPI
SPF 2.1 2.1 NA
Baseline 2.3 2.5
Baseline + $100 oil 3.0 2.7
Baseline + $150 oil 3.3 4.1
NOTE: The baseline forecast is an AR(4) plus the CFNAI. The forecast horizon for the Survey of Professional Forecasters is
2008:Q1–2009:Q1.the baseline forecasts predict modestly higher
overall and core inflation for 2008 than does the
SPF forecast. Second, the model predicts a con-
siderable acceleration in PCEPI inflation rates in
2008 and 2009 should oil prices increase to $100
or $150 per barrel. Perhaps most worrisome is
that the augmented Hamilton model predicts that
a permanent increase in crude oil prices to $150
per barrel will lead to overall and core inflation
rates of 4 percent (or slightly above) in 2009. If
this model is correct, the prospect of crude oil
prices rising to $150 per barrel could produce a
significant acceleration in inflation in 2009.
CONCLUSION
The analysis in this paper has used a version
of Hamilton’s model to gauge the effects of higher
oil prices on real GDP growth and inflation. One
finding of this study is that the model’s explana-
tory power is dramatically improved by adding
the Chicago Fed National Activity Index as an
explanatory variable. This addition, however, does
not diminish another finding—consistent with
those in the literature—that oil price increases
do matter. Second, oil prices matter more for
some GDP components than others, such as real
consumer spending. The model also predicts
significantly negative effects on business capital
spending. Moreover, this sensitivity seems to have
increased considerably since 1995 compared with
the period from 1970 to 1995.
To gauge the predictive power of these find-
ings, a simple forecasting exercise using
Hamilton’s model augmented with the CFNAI
shows that the estimated negative effects of $100-
per-barrel oil on real GDP growth are significant
but would wane by the end of 2008. An additional
$50-per-barrel increase in the price of crude oil
would cut real GDP growth by about 0.25 percent-
age points in 2008, but by only 0.1 percentage
points in 2009 (both relative to a baseline forecast
that excludes oil prices). Statistically, real con-
sumption expenditures would experience simi-
larly large but more persistent negative growth.
The augmented Hamilton model predicts much
more modest—and less persistent—effects on the
growth of real business fixed investment. Finally,
the model predicts that a permanent increase in
crude oil prices to $150 per barrel would cause
overall and core PCEPI inflation to rise to 4 per-
cent in 2009. This result, if correct, suggests that
policymakers may need to be quite vigilant should
oil prices rise to limits heretofore thought unlikely
by most analysts.
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